A provably secure proof-of-stake blockchain protocol
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- UniqueChain: A Fast, Provably Secure Proof-of-Stake Based Blockchain Protocol in the Open Setting
- Smart contract development in the booming DeFi sector & More Cryptocurrency News Today
- Efficient Provably Secure Blockchain Protocols And Applications
- Article Info.
- Dr. Roberto Fernández Félix
- Proof-of-Approval: A Distributed Consensus Protocol for Blockchains
- Ouroboros: A Provably Secure Proof-of-Stake Blockchain Protocol
- Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake protocol
UniqueChain: A Fast, Provably Secure Proof-of-Stake Based Blockchain Protocol in the Open Setting
Embed Size px x x x x We present Ouroboros, the first blockchain protocol based on proof of stake with rig-orous security guarantees. We establish security properties for the protocol comparable tothose achieved by the bitcoin blockchain protocol. As the protocol provides a proof of stakeblockchain discipline, it offers qualitative efficiency advantages over blockchains based on proofof physical resources e.
We also present a novel reward mechanism for in-centivizing Proof of Stake protocols and we prove that, given this mechanism, honest behavioris an approximate Nash equilibrium, thus neutralizing attacks such as selfish mining. We alsopresent initial evidence of the practicality of our protocol in real world settings by providingexperimental results on transaction confirmation and processing. A primary consideration regarding the operation of blockchain protocols based on proof of work PoW such as bitcoin [30]is the energy required for their execution.
At the time of this writ-ing, generating a single block on the bitcoin blockchain requires a number of hashing operationsexceeding , which results in striking energy demands. Indeed, early calculations indicated thatthe energy requirements of the protocol were comparable to that of a small country [32]. This state of affairs has motivated the investigation of alternative blockchain protocols thatwould obviate the need for proof of work by substituting it with another, more energy efficient,mechanism that can provide similar guarantees.
It is important to point out that the proof of workmechanism of bitcoin facilitates a type of randomized leader election process that elects one ofthe miners to issue the next block. Furthermore, provided that all miners follow the protocol, thisselection is performed in a randomized fashion proportionally to the computational power of eachminer. Deviations from the protocol may distort this proportionality as exemplified by selfishmining strategies [21, 38].
A natural alternative mechanism relies on the notion of proof of stake PoS. Rather thanminers investing computational resources in order to participate in the leader election process, theyinstead run a process that randomly selects one of them proportionally to the stake that eachpossesses according to the current blockchain ledger. University of Connecticut.
Work partly supported by European Research Council. In effect, this yields a self-referential blockchain discipline: maintaining the blockchain relies onthe stakeholders themselves and assigns work to them as well as rewards based on the amountof stake that each possesses as reported in the ledger. Aside from this, the discipline should makeno further artificial computational demands on the stakeholders.
In some sense, this soundsideal; however, realizing such a proof-of-stake protocol appears to involve a number of definitional,technical, and analytic challenges. Previous work. The concept of PoS has been discussed extensively in the bitcoin forum. Although Bentovet al.
Heuristic proof-of-stake based blockchain protocols have been proposed and implemented for anumber of cryptocurrencies. See [4] for a discussionof various attacks. It is also interesting to contrast a PoS-based blockchain protocol with a classical consensusblockchain that relies on a fixed set of authorities see, e. What distinguishes a PoS-basedblockchain from those which assume static authorities is that stake changes over time and hencethe trust assumption evolves with the system.
Another alternative to PoW is the concept of proof of space [2, 20], which has been specificallyinvestigated in the context of blockchain protocols [33]. A related concept is proofof space-time PoST [28]. In all these cases, however, an expensive physical resource either storageor computational power is necessary.
The PoS Design challenge. A fundamental problem for PoS-based blockchain protocols is tosimulate the leader election process. In order to achieve a fair randomized election among stake-holders, entropy must be introduced into the system, and mechanisms to introduce entropy may beprone to manipulation by the adversary. For instance, an adversary controlling a set of stakeholdersmay attempt to simulate the protocol execution trying different sequences of stakeholder partici-pants so that it finds a protocol continuation that favors the adversarial stakeholders.
This leadsto a so called grinding vulnerability, where adversarial parties may use computational resourcesto bias the leader election. Our Results. We present Ouroboros, a provably secure proof of stake system. To the best ofour knowledge this is the first blockchain protocol of its kind with a rigorous security analysis.
Inmore detail, our results are as follows. First, we provide a model that formalizes the problem of realizing a PoS-based blockchain proto-col. The model we introduce is in the spirit of [24], focusing on persistence and liveness, two formalproperties of a robust transaction ledger. Persistence states that once a node of the system pro-claims a certain transaction as stable, the remaining nodes, if queried and responding honestly,.
Posts by user QuantumMechanic andothers. Here, stability is to be understood as a predicate that will be parame-terized by some security parameter k that will affect the certainty with which the property holds. Liveness ensures that once an honestly generated transactionhas been made available for a sufficient amount of time to the network nodes, say u time steps,it will become stable. The conjunction of liveness and persistence provides a robust transactionledger in the sense that honestly generated transactions are adopted and become immutable.
Ourmodel is suitably amended to facilitate PoS-based dynamics. Second, we describe a novel blockchain protocol based on PoS. Our protocol assumes that partiescan freely create accounts and receive and make payments, and that stake shifts over time. Weutilize a very simple secure multiparty implementation of a coin-flipping protocol to produce therandomness for the leader election process.
This distinguishes our approach and prevents so calledgrinding attacks from other previous solutions that either defined such values deterministicallybased on the current state of the blockchain or used collective coin flipping as a way to introduceentropy [4]. Also, unique to our approach is the fact that the system ignores round-to-roundstake modifications. Instead, a snapshot of the current set of stakeholders is taken in regularintervals called epochs; in each such interval a secure multiparty computation takes place utilizingthe blockchain itself as the broadcast channel.
Specifically, in each epoch a set of randomly selectedstakeholders form a committee which is then responsible for executing the coin-flipping protocol. The outcome of the protocol determines the set of next stakeholders to execute the protocol in thenext epoch as well as the outcomes of all leader elections for the epoch. Third, we provide a set of formal arguments establishing that no adversary can break persistenceand liveness.
Our protocol is secure under a number of plausible assumptions: 1 the networkis synchronous in the sense that an upper bound can be determined during which any honeststakeholder is able to communicate with any other stakeholder, 2 a number of stakeholders drawnfrom the honest majority is available as needed to participate in each epoch, 3 the stakeholdersdo not remain offline for long periods of time, 4 the adaptivity of corruptions is subject to a smalldelay that is measured in rounds linear in the security parameter or alternatively, the playershave access to a sender-anonymous broadcast channel.
At the core of our security arguments is aprobabilistic argument regarding a combinatorial notion of forkable strings which we formulate,prove and also verify experimentally. In our analysis we also distinguish covert attacks, a specialclass of general forking attacks. Covertness here is interpreted in the spirit of covert adversariesagainst secure multiparty computation protocols, cf.
We show that covertly forkable strings are asubclass of the f. Click here to load reader See Full Reader. Post on Aug views. Category: Documents 0 download. IOHK, roman. Persistence states that once a node of the system pro-claims a certain transaction as stable, the remaining nodes, if queried and responding honestly, 1See Proof of stake instead of proof of work, Bitcoin forum thread. Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous Ouroboros - The Finale - Ishya ' The Ouroboros.
The Egyptian Ouroboros. Ouroboros - Helsinkidesi The Ouroboros accommodates 12, sqm floor area, in which 3, sqm exhibition. In Ouroboros Praos, deciding whether a certain.
Smart contract development in the booming DeFi sector & More Cryptocurrency News Today
As for using it for Layer 1 systems, Andrew Poelstra nailed it in his conclusion [0]: "We showed that by depending only on resources within the system, proof of stake cannot be used to form a distributed consensus, since it depends on the very history it is trying to form to enforce loss of value. PoS on the other hand is much closer to a clean "what you earn is proportional to what you put in" design, which is realistically the best that you can do in an anonymous system where users can generate as many independent identities as they want. This is also not true. In PoW, miners must sell their tokens to buy capital-intensive mining equipment and power to stay competitive. In PoS, stakers have no incentive to sell enough tokens to anyone who could turn around and stake them as a competitor, since that would cut into the seller's future staking rewards. First, consensus protocols can be trivially safe regardless of the network's behavior -- you simply require a majority vote for any proposed agreement. This is again irrespective of the network model -- Leslie Lamport's proofs do not make any assumptions about the network.
Efficient Provably Secure Blockchain Protocols And Applications
Aggelos Kiayias 51 Estimated H-index: Estimated H-index: We establish security properties for the protocol comparable to those achieved by the bitcoin blockchain protocol. We also present a novel reward mechanism for incentivizing Proof of Stake protocols and we prove that, given this mechanism, honest behavior is an approximate Nash equilibrium, thus neutralizing attacks such as selfish mining. References 33 Citations Cite. Practical Byzantine fault tolerance. Read Later. The Byzantine generals problem. References
Article Info.
Ouroboros, the mad Ringleader from Operation Cube, is here. It seems like we have heard the same pitch a thousand times before. It is the first blockchain platform to evolve out of a scientific philosophy and a research-first driven approach. Cardano operates as a proof-of-stake PoS blockchain platform that seeks to be a decentralized application. The first Cardano Kyiv Meetup took place on August 28, , and the main topic was the Ouroboros protocol.
Dr. Roberto Fernández Félix
Abstract : Bitcoin has ushered in a new era of interest in cryptocurrencies and distributed algorithms for consensus. While Bitcoin provides a spectacular solution in this space, it uses a "proof-of-work" mechanism that makes quite awesome resource demands: the protocol is projected to burn approximately 70TWh next year, as much as the country of Austria. Proof-of-stake is an alternative framework that has the potential to remove these energy demands. However, proof-of-stake protocols face numerous analytic challenges that do not exist in the proof-of-work setting. We will begin with an overview of the Bitcoin system, focusing on the proof-of-work mechanism.
Proof-of-Approval: A Distributed Consensus Protocol for Blockchains
Skip to Main Content. A not-for-profit organization, IEEE is the world's largest technical professional organization dedicated to advancing technology for the benefit of humanity. Use of this web site signifies your agreement to the terms and conditions. Proof-of-Stake Sidechains Abstract: Sidechains have long been heralded as the key enabler of blockchain scalability and interoperability. However, no modeling of the concept or a provably secure construction has so far been attempted.
Ouroboros: A Provably Secure Proof-of-Stake Blockchain Protocol
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Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake protocol
RELATED VIDEO: Cardano Paper Overview: Ouroboros Proof-of-Stake Blockchain ProtocolAn environmentally sustainable, verifiably secure proof-of-stake protocol with rigorous security guarantees. A proof-of-stake protocol that provides and improves the security guarantees of proof-of-work at a fraction of the energy cost. Ouroboros is the first provably secure proof-of-stake protocol, and the first blockchain protocol to be based on peer-reviewed research. Ouroboros combines unique technology and mathematically-verified mechanisms - which, in turn, combine behavioral psychology and economic philosophy - to ensure the security and sustainability of the blockchains that depend upon it.
His research interests include blockchain technology, optimization software, parallel computing, development and application of various operation research techniques. Grigaitis is a partnership associate professor at Vilnius University, a member of the Blockchain Group in the Institute of Data Science and Digital Technologies, and an experienced industry professional. His research interests focus on blockchain technologies, large-scale distributed systems and artificial intelligence. Received the doctoral degree in informatics engineering from the Vilnius University in His main research interests include blockchain technologies, global optimization, high-performance and parallel computing, IoT and internet technologies. His main research interests include blockchain technologies, global and multi-objective optimization, evolutionary algorithms, high-performance computing, artificial intelligence, and image processing. Volume 30, Issue 4 , pp.
We establish security properties for the protocol comparable to those achieved by the bitcoin blockchain protocol. We also present a novel reward mechanism for in- centivizing Proof of Stake protocols and we prove that, given this mechanism, honest behavior is an approximate Nash equilibrium, thus neutralizing attacks such as selfish mining. We also present initial evidence of the practicality of our protocol in real world settings by providing experimental results on transaction confirmation and processing.
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