Chainhead ethereum
For a standard API that all Ethereum beacon nodes implement, see here. One of the required components of nodes in the Ethereum beacon chain network is to expose an API server for outside interaction. This API is critical for running validators on Ethereum, as validator clients can connect to nodes and query their API to figure out their assigned duties, to submit block proposals, and more. Interacting with the API requires the use of protocol buffers, also known as protobuf.
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Mining process analysis of dieke Ethereum source code analysis
But by observing some simple rules, we can still get very quick confirmation when network conditions are good, even for non-finalized blocks, under stronger assumptions high network synchronicity. This gives a very high degree of safety for any finalized epoch. But having to wait blocks between As an example, kraken currently requires 30 blocks confirmation for ETH deposits, or 7 minutes — so waiting for finality would actually be a regression in terms of UX.
It is not possible to make any absolute guarantees on any non-finalized chains. To get that property, you need byzantine fault tolerance which is what finalization in FFG does. Attackers can thus revert a number of blocks by withholding their blocks and their own attestations.
Some resistance to the bounce attack was added here. There is a proposed fix for short term reorgs in the form of the block, slot fork choice rule. This means that whenever a block is missing, the current attesters vote for that specific slot being empty, as well as the previous block, and thus an empty chain also gets quick confirmation. Past approaches at fixing these problems at least from the safety perspective have focused on making the current head as sticky as possible.
However, there is also another point of view: All of the above attacks are actually clearly visible on chain, if you pay more attention to it rather than just finding the head. The attacker has to withhold some attestations in order to be able to switch the fork choice to another head.
We want to be assured that the current head or some previous block on the current fork choice rule will not be reverted by any of the above attacks. This is how we get this assurance:. Since Block C and its attestations are withheld by the attacker, we only see Block B and think that it is the head. However, when we try to apply our rule, it will fail when evaluated at the empty slot 1: The honest votes for slot 1 actually vote for Block A, because no new block was available yet.
This can be seen from the red withheld attacker chain, that gets a total of attestations at slot 1, and will thus beat the current head in the fork choice rule when it is released. If you want to be safe from reorgs you should wait for more confirmations and have to stick to an earlier head that can be considered safe maybe block A in this example.
The empty slot can thus be considered secure assuming synchronous networking conditions, and Block B is a safe head under these assumptions. This proposal is for the current fork choice rule implemented in Eth2 at genesis. Currently several modifications to that fork choice are considered.
Going to the block, slot fork choice rule will make this problem easier, but it is still a wise choice to count the number of attestations of a head and its ancestors before trusting it.
However, the block, slot fork choice rule, at least in its most naive form, imposes a 4s synchronicity condition in order to make any progress at all and is thus not great for liveness.
An interesting alternative that was suggested recently is to use the FFG head vote as another LMD ghost message, to remedy the problem of epoch boundary blocks reverting that was pointed out here. Under this suggestion, the full fork choice would be a hierarchy of This rule has the effect of enforcing the block, slot fork choice rule only on epoch boundary blocks, for much better liveness latencies of up to one epoch can be tolerated.
It may be tempting to try to make sure that reorgs never happen, and this is what the block, slot fork choice rule attempts to do. However, this is at the expense of liveness and a solution that provides good liveness is not yet known and may indeed be impossible.
However, we can see in this post that we can easily find out whether the current head is susceptible to a minority reorg attack. If exchanges and other high-value users of blockchains use this method for fast confirmations, they can get security vastly exceeding that of PoW chains without having to wait for finality. Current fixes Some resistance to the bounce attack was added here. Suggested approach Past approaches at fixing these problems at least from the safety perspective have focused on making the current head as sticky as possible.
This is how we get this assurance: Any finalized epoch clearly cannot be reverted, so start from the finalized epoch Justified epochs can be reverted, but only if a later epoch on another fork gets justified.
This will likely fail on the current epoch, which does not have enough attestations. We need to ensure that the fork choice cannot be reverted. We do this by once again starting from e , checking that at every slot, the chain cannot be reverted by withheld votes.
The tricky part of this is empty slots, which are exactly the crux of the short reorg attacks, because the current attestations do not vote for empty slots, only for their ancestor. When you evaluate the rule at an empty slot, you only count those attestations that vote for it as an empty slot.
This means that only attestations that vote for a filled slot that comes after the empty slot count; those that vote for its filled ancestor do not fix the empty slot as an empty slot, and should be counted as abstentions from the vote.
How to modify this under suggested changes of the fork choice rule This proposal is for the current fork choice rule implemented in Eth2 at genesis. Under this suggestion, the full fork choice would be a hierarchy of 4: Find latest finalized epoch Find latest justified epoch Find highest epoch boundary block according to LMD GHOST on FFG target votes Find head block according to LMD GHOST on head votes This rule has the effect of enforcing the block, slot fork choice rule only on epoch boundary blocks, for much better liveness latencies of up to one epoch can be tolerated.
Conclusion It may be tempting to try to make sure that reorgs never happen, and this is what the block, slot fork choice rule attempts to do.
Health DeFi Chain Price (HEAD)
All the text that appears with a side-bar like this is my added commentary; everything else is directly from the original specification document. This document concerns the Phase 0 beacon chain state transition function. It's basically the brains of the operation. There's a good deal more to building a fully functioning client, such as networking, fork choice, and validator behaviour: other documents cover these. For all the rest of it databases, architecture, optimisations, metrics, Eth1 data handling, Phase 0 of Ethereum 2.
mrchainhead
The main process of Ethereum mining is miner The package is responsible for the following basic architecture:. First, the external is through miner Object, miner Inside is practical worker Object to realize the overall function of mining. In the figure above, we can see that there are four cycles, which pass through several channel Responsible for different things:. TaskLoop Is to submit a new mining task, and resultLoop It is some processing done after successful block output. Tert block collection is divided into local miner packing blocks and other mining packing blocks. Give priority to the blocks dug by yourself. When selecting, the blocks that are too old will be deleted first, and only the most recent 7 stalethreshold heights will be selected Select two blocks Put it into a new block Verification will be carried out while adding tertiary blocks, including the following:.
Ethereum minning card Best
But by observing some simple rules, we can still get very quick confirmation when network conditions are good, even for non-finalized blocks, under stronger assumptions high network synchronicity. This gives a very high degree of safety for any finalized epoch. But having to wait blocks between As an example, kraken currently requires 30 blocks confirmation for ETH deposits, or 7 minutes — so waiting for finality would actually be a regression in terms of UX.
What everyone gets wrong about 51% attacks
Find centralized, trusted content and collaborate around the technologies you use most. Connect and share knowledge within a single location that is structured and easy to search. Then I made new account and started mining. It works. But when I restart geth, block chain state seems not saved. Stack Overflow for Teams — Collaborate and share knowledge with a private group.
The Beacon Chain Ethereum 2.0 explainer you need to read first
This book is a collaboration between Andreas M. Antonopoulos and Dr. Gavin Wood. A series of fortunate coincidences brought these two authors together in an effort that galvanized hundreds of contributors to produce this book, in the best spirit of open source and the creative commons culture. Gavin had been wishing to write a book that expanded on the Yellow Paper his technical description of the Ethereum protocol for some time, primarily to open it up to a wider audience than the original Greek-letter-infused document could possibly allow.
What Does Altair Bring to Ethereum 2.0?
Ethereum Stack Exchange is a question and answer site for users of Ethereum, the decentralized application platform and smart contract enabled blockchain. It only takes a minute to sign up. Connect and share knowledge within a single location that is structured and easy to search.
We assume you have a solid foundation of Ethereum or Bitcoin, and some familiarity with Proof of Stake. To appreciate the Beacon Chain, an introduction to sharding helps. The main problem in scalability that blockchains, including Ethereum, currently face is: every node has to verify and execute every transaction. For decentralization, blockchains need to scale horizontally. A goal of Ethereum 2.
As promised in the last update, this update will introduce the merged Ethereum client architecture in depth. In the th core developer meeting video, tweet , we reached a consensus on two times for the difficulty bomb: the upgrade will be carried out in December , and it will be postponed to June For this, we need a network upgrade-Arrow Glacier, which will only include EIP on the delayed difficulty bomb. Arrow Glacier plans to activate at block 13,,, and it is expected to be activated on December 8, At the core developer meeting, we discussed multiple options postponed during the Ice Age. Of course, mergers and difficulty bombs are separate: it requires a separate network upgrade, and is based on the PoW total difficulty threshold to activate. Similarly, if we encounter problems with the transition, we can decide to postpone the difficulty bomb again.
Altair is the nearest upcoming hard fork on the Ethereum 2. Is it important or not? Something in between. Altair will implement a few changes into the Beacon Chain that will make it ready for a full-scale launch.
Most likely. Most likely.
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