Blockchain selfish mining
A situation in which a miner mines a new block but does not broadcast this new block to the other miners. However, miners can greatly optimize mining and increase yield by engaging in selfish mining. If they stop declaring new blocks to the public network, it can make the process go faster and reduce resource waste. This process is continued until the forked chain is greater than the original chain and is more lucrative to mine. It can cause the forked chain to become more dominant than the original one, which severely compromises decentralization.
We are searching data for your request:
Upon completion, a link will appear to access the found materials.
Content:
- On the detection of selfish mining and stalker attacks in blockchain networks
- Selfish Mining Explained
- Security and Privacy Lab
- Why the Cornell paper on Bitcoin mining is important
- Selfish mining attack
- Competing (Semi)-Selfish Miners in Bitcoin
- What is Bitcoin Selfish Mining?
- Shintaro Ishihara, Japanese politician who set off row with China, dies at 89 -NHK
- U.S. Senators Close to Russian Sanctions Bill: Ukraine Update
On the detection of selfish mining and stalker attacks in blockchain networks
Posts Comments. Joint post with Andrew Miller , University of Maryland. Yes it is, say the authors. But this has been disputed as well. In other words, the jury is still out. But something has been lost in all the noise about the grandiose statements — on their way to getting to their strong claim, the authors make a weaker and much more defensible argument, namely that selfish miners can earn more than their fair share of mining revenue.
This is in fact a novel and interesting result, with potentially serious consequences. Eyal and Sirer argue that this is false [1]. This is a problem for our ability to reason about Bitcoin.
The cryptography in Bitcoin is considered solid. Running a Bitcoin node means being willing to accept connections from strangers.
This makes it problematic to apply existing theoretical models to analyze the security of Bitcoin. It is definitely possible to make the messaging layer of the network more resistant to Sybil attacks. Another possibility is to require that potential peer nodes solve a puzzle, similar to the proof-of-work mechanism used for mining rewards [3].
The Bitcoin developers have been taking this issue seriously, and it is likely that they will quickly deploy defenses to shore up the P2P layer against attacks.
The security of Bitcoin is frequently portrayed as cryptographic in nature, and economic arguments are sometimes invoked. But so far, a third factor has proven to be at least as important: the responsiveness of the developer community. Perhaps in the future, the theoretical underpinnings will be much more clearly understood, diminishing the need for frequent software and protocol updates in response to potential crises.
Network vulnerabilities could potentially make this threshold much smaller. Given an adversarial mining strategy, can a coalition form around it? This is an orthogonal question that awaits a definitive answer. The paper does not challenge this assumption, however. That also moderate their interest in short-term profit-maximization versus health of the system.
As long as we are operating on one of these equilibria, a rational actor will never engage in selfish mining. The authors develop screwy conclusions by adopting a one-off framework where there is no repeat play.
Taken litereally, there mining process is like this: 1 I purchase a hash, choose a mining strategy, and mine with that hash. In this setting, I do not care at all about the future because I am only playing the game once. If miners play the game more than once, i. I responded to you on an earlier post, trying to read these sequentially not having visited this site for a while.
This post from you, does sure up my own thinking regards to what you are saying about the different models; so I am sure I understand what at least you are talking about. Ahh; and yes, in that case, we need to understand psychology here.
Or, will they be power hungry trolls from another economic model entering the bitcoin mining for their own sake? Can bitcoiners truly presume everyone playing the game has the game itself as their motivator [as chess players do]? Or, is there a chance that some playing the game are game hackers.
So long as Bitcoins can be traded like any other currency to any other recognized currency in the world be it US Dollars or Chinese Renminbi [where I see the world more likely going toward] there is a heavy incentive for adversarial mining that is NOT bitcoin enthusiastic. In other words there is a high possibility there will be those who enter the game simply to win it once and then leave with all the power granted to them in another economic currency.
They may even enter the game a second or third time etc. My knowledge of psychology tells me there WILL be game hackers if they find that they can profit; that leaves the questions as only how many hackers does it take to profit, and can they coalesce together, and as such be successful at their hacking attempt. Of course, it also sures up my mind on the bitcoin enthusiasts themselves; they are also hackers, they are economic hackers, they are playing a game of trying to get their own work to be more profitable by pushing their own currency compared to other global curacies.
Government, for example, to avoid an uncintrollable currency. Then they the Govenrment?? Also because the rewards of the selfish mine strategy do not offset the loss in value of the bitcoins. Then Snowden leaks the information. Any way the paper is the most interesting challenge to conventionnal wisdom about bitcoin network security. When competing miners discover different blocks why not just disallow both blocks?
What you are suggesting is a lethal protocol change. The change would mean potentially that the blockchain could be disrupted by a rogue miner: say the head block is number n. The honest miner would have wasted its computation efforts and the block chain length would be stuck at n. I doubt that your suggested change will be adopted ;O. While the Eyal-Sirer paper is clearly valuable for its analysis of strategic mining with some rigor, I predict its ultimate impact will be to remind people that lots of other, harder-to-analyze factors dominate in real systems.
Mining pools have been operating for years in a trench-warfare environment. Defending quietly, via ad-hoc and non-public action, avoids educating or encouraging either the original attackers or copycats. For example:.
I assume all participants are self-interested, but have varied values and are already practicing diverse strategies beyond a simple two-type model.
But there have been large, well-funded, profit-seeking mining groups in operation for years, highly motivated to independently discover and implement this strategy. Pool operators watch their performance versus expectations very closely, and regularly seek advantage over rivals in features, payouts, and policies.
Further, ES-mining would leave public evidence, in the rates of orphaned blocks, consecutive block-batches from certain pools, and skews in block timestamps. But have the authors looked for such evidence? Even holding physical plant constant: the network as a whole will generate fewer main-chain blocks, in the presence of ES-mining, for same amount of wall-clock time.
The magnitude of this cost increase, for the ES-miner, relative to the gain will determine whether ES-mining is profitable at the outset. There will be other costs to ES-mining, especially as it grows.
It must somehow prove to its own members that it is not underpaying them, even while attracting them with its proven ability to underpay the outside world — a difficult proposition technically and socially.
Clandestine discipline is costly, perhaps super-linearly. Simple uncoordinated tit-for-tat strategies by other miners may be sufficient for mutual deterrence.
Motivated-enforcers will improvise multiple strategies, and incur larger losses, to enforce norms until they see abuse subsiding. Taken together, these are symptoms of trusting a clean abstract model moreso than empirical system behavior.
Such prescriptions are premature; more real-world observation makes sense instead. If and when evidence of unchecked ES-mining arrives — and it should be obvious if it does — there will be plenty of time, and ideas, for countermeasures. Ha, googling your name, I see that you have an undergraduate economics degree.
This has allowed you to progress farther along the road to common sense then other participants in this debate. Freedom to Tinker Research and expert commentary on digital technologies in public life.
November 9, by Arvind Narayanan. Comments Andreas Schuster says:. November 9, at pm. Gordon Mohr says:. Cunicula says:. November 11, at am. Nathan T. November 13, at pm. Cunicula, I responded to you on an earlier post, trying to read these sequentially not having visited this site for a while. Paolo says:. November 10, at am. Anonymous says:. November 12, at am. Robert says:. Boussac says:. November 16, at am. November 10, at pm. Freedom to Tinker is hosted by Princeton's Center for Information Technology Policy , a research center that studies digital technologies in public life.
Here you'll find comment and analysis from the digital frontier, written by the Center's faculty, students, and friends. Contributors Select Author Aleecia M. Lee Vanessa Teague and J. Return to top of page.
Selfish Mining Explained
By Dom DiFurio. Steinfeld says he may take a loss on the event, specifically. At opening on Saturday at 9 a. Depending on the variation, Charizard cards can sell online for thousands if not tens of thousands of dollars, according to leading card grading company PSA.
Security and Privacy Lab
Bloomberg — Russia further boosted troop levels on the Ukrainian border this weekend, according to the Pentagon. Senators are close to finalizing the language for a sanctions bill, and the U. The U. Wall Street banks briefed by U. It depends on what Vladimir Putin might want to do. It urged Moscow to avoid steps which would complicate the diplomatic process, including the work of the Normandy format, which involves representatives of Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France. Russia wants an explanation of European security obligations from Western nations before making its next proposals on the Ukraine crisis, said Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said. Petersburg in memory of the victims of the siege of Leningrad. In an interview with Journal du Dimanche, Le Drian also declined to detail what possible sanctions against Russia could be, because he said describing them would undermine the effectiveness of the threat.
Why the Cornell paper on Bitcoin mining is important
This Authors Article. Email: editor. Home Volume 7, Issue 8 Authors. Show Article Download Cite Statistics Share Abstract We examine the impact of propagation delay on the evolution of the Bitcoin blockchain in the sense of the selfish-mining strategy suggested by Eyal and Sirer.
Selfish mining attack
Bitcoin mining The bitcoin generator is an innovative tool which is able to extract bitcoins from multiple mining pools. May 24, Messages 1, Reaction score Bitcoin mining drove up the cost of electricity in the city so dramatically that, in , Plattsburgh enacted a moratorium on new mining … Visualizing the Power Consumption of Bitcoin Mining Cryptocurrencies have been some of the most talked-about assets in recent months, with bitcoin and ether prices reaching record highs. Mining Bitcoin is the process of transaction in the cryptocurrency system.
Competing (Semi)-Selfish Miners in Bitcoin
Selfish is an attack on the integrity of the Bitcoin network. This is where one miner, or mining pool , does not publish and distribute a valid solution to the rest of the network. The selfish miner then continues to mine the next block and so on maintaining its lead. When the rest of the network is about to catch up with the selfish miner, he, or they, then release here portion of solved blocks into the network. The result is that their chain and proof of work is longer and more difficult so the rest of the network adopts their block solutions and they claim the block rewards.
What is Bitcoin Selfish Mining?
Skip to Main Content. A not-for-profit organization, IEEE is the world's largest technical professional organization dedicated to advancing technology for the benefit of humanity. Use of this web site signifies your agreement to the terms and conditions.
Shintaro Ishihara, Japanese politician who set off row with China, dies at 89 -NHK
RELATED VIDEO: BITCOIN safe-crypto.me THIS REAL?A recent academic study says Tezos is threatened by "selfish mining," providing a valid attack model for other live and up-and-coming proof-of-stake PoS cryptocurrencies. However, the ability to address governance issues quickly raises questions concerning possible trade-offs involved with on-chain governance, how voting works and the possible outcomes of staking centralization. Through the attack, the initial baker gains both the block and endorsement reward for the invalid block and can continue the attack until detected. In Tezos, stakers gain fractions of a block reward for endorsing the creation of a new block, which packages network transactions. Selfish mining occurs in Nakamoto-style consensus mechanisms, like Tezos, which follow the longest chain rule.
U.S. Senators Close to Russian Sanctions Bill: Ukraine Update
Incentive mechanism is the key to the success of the Bitcoin system as a permissionless blockchain. It encourages participants to contribute their computing resources to ensure the correctness and consistency of user transaction records. Selfish mining attacks may cause the loss of mining power, especially those of honest participants, which brings great security challenges to the Bitcoin system. Although there are a series of studies against selfish mining behaviors, these works have certain limitations: either the existing protocol needs to be modified or the detection effect for attacks is not satisfactory. We propose the ForkDec, a high-accuracy system for selfish mining detection based on the fully connected neural network, for the purpose of effectively deterring selfish attackers.
In brief Bitcoin mining's migration to North America has raised scrutiny of its environmental impact. Mining giant Foundry claims the industry is accelerating a move to renewables. The issue has become hot enough to merit a hearing in Congress. When Congress meets on Thursday to discuss the environmental impact of cryptocurrency, it will highlight a growing problem for Bitcoin miners: the perception, fair or not, that they are a menace to the planet.
I agree with you, thanks for the explanation. As always, all ingenious is simple.